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## **GNOSEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN CAPITAL**

The problem of the interrelation between consciousness and matter as the basis for the formation of a human as a personality cannot be solved without taking social laws into account. Consciousness, as known, is not only a property of a highly organized matter but also a product of social development. A scientific concept of the development of such a category as human capital is impossible without understanding social laws.

Knowledge of the highest form of movement is the key to understanding movement in general as well as all its other forms. According to the principle of the unity of the historical and the logical, the research on a subject is started from a mature form of its development; only after that, they turn to the history of the development and formation of the subject of research, in order to then return to the present state - the highest stage of development of the subject. This applies to development in general and human capital in particular. To understand its essence, origin, main tendency, the correlation of the main forms, that is, to create a concept of development, it is first of all necessary to analyze the highest social form of the matter motion, in this case, the human capital, because knowledge of the laws of social development is the key to understanding other forms of the matter motion. [1]

It is generally accepted that anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism do not and can not exist in dialectics as the basis of scientific research, because the laws of dialectics did not arise as a result of the transfer of the social laws to natural phenomena. But knowledge of the social development laws serves as a necessary prerequisite and basis for both the formation of a worldview and an understanding of the laws of any development in general. Knowledge exists only when there is consciousness.

F. Engels rightly asserted that if «we pose the question of what thinking and consciousness are, where do they come from, then we will see that they are products of the human brain and that man himself is a product of nature, developed in a certain environment and together with it. It goes without saying by virtue of this that the products of the human brain, which are ultimately also products of nature, do not contradict the rest of the connection of nature, but correspond to it» [2]. Therefore, a fruitful study and solution of epistemological problems are possible only on the basis of generalizing the results of the entire experience of theoretical and practical comprehension of nature and social life, which was accumulated through knowledge as a theoretical form of resolving contradictions between subject and object.

Gnoseology cannot solve the question of the identity of matter and consciousness without establishing their opposition. All epistemological problems proceed from matter and consciousness being the identity of opposites, showing in each specific case how the opposite becomes identical, and the identical becomes the opposite. For example, dialectical materialism establishes both opposition and identity, mutual transformation into each other, the unity of practice and cognition, when practice itself becomes a moment of cognition, and the latter becomes a constituent element of practical activity. And practice and cognition, in turn, are one of the specific forms of the identity of opposites: matter and consciousness. For gnoseology, the content of the knowledge gained is important in its relation to the objective reality surrounding us, being both a process and a tendency of its development at the same time.

Cognition generated by the interaction of subject and object in the process of social practice has a social nature from the very beginning of its emergence. This primarily follows from the nature of the subject, which is society itself. Man is, first of all, a social being. As Karl Marx wrote, «But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man – state, society» [3]. Moreover, man is also not only a peculiar result, a product of the development of nature directly, but is also closely connected to it. Therefore, in the process of cognition, even an object acquires a social content.

It is impossible to ignore the problem of economic relations arising in a social formation, in particular, the estrangement of labor in conditions of commodity-money relations, where the process of estrangement occurs

not due to the very nature of labor, materialization, objectification of human activity, but based on the domination of private property and transformation of labor being a carrier of human capital into a commodity.

The dialectical nature of cognition is disclosed with the help of such a category as estrangement, which should be considered as a special form of objectification of the consciousness' procreation. This means that a person equates himself every time with such a machine that he is capable of creating. Herewith, the more developed and mature both the person himself and the human society is, the more complex the machine with which he compares himself would be. Since there is no limit to the possibilities for human development in the material world, it can be concluded that with the development of humanity, newer and newest technical machines, to which a human can be equated, will certainly appear. Any new models of technology reveal new aspects of the human essence as well. Therefore, with each new machine not only the identity between it and a human increases but also their fundamental difference, their opposition, grows. With development, a person becomes so rich in inner content that neither the most modern and complex machines separately, nor their aggregated complex, cannot comprehend the depth of his essence as the owner of human capital.

It can be assumed that a human is a machine to the same extent that a machine is human. In this statement lies both the identity and the opposition between them. A machine is a reflection of a human, in which the human essence is defined at the current stage of its development. The machine is a material product of the human activity, and this is the essence of their unity and opposition. The connection between them is not natural, but socio-historical.

The point here is that by setting some limits for a machine, we essentially set these limits for a human, for the level of development of his thinking and the technology he created. After all, technology is a product of human activity and its tool. Trying to stop technical progress means attempting to stop the development of all mankind. It would seem that by setting the boundaries to the possibility of technological progress we want to raise a human above it, thereby showing his exceptionalism, but in reality, we are only belittling his intellect and the potential of production capacity. By arguing about the boundaries and limits of technical means we thereby detach them from a human, turn them into an independent force capable of self-development. One of such modern trends in scientific development is artificial intelligence, which is based on biotechnology and robotic systems.

Such modern latest developments, like any others, have no limits and boundaries to their evolution. They are widely used at present as a tool of human activity and they will invade its most diverse spheres in the future. A human being, continuing to develop as a unique factor of production and being the bearer of human capital, will delegate his physical and mental labor functions to the machine as much as possible, which will undoubtedly increase human power over the forces of nature and society.

### **References**

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3. K. Marx, F. Engels. Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right / Works, second edition. vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1955. p. 414.