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ЗАХІДНОУКРАЇНСЬКИЙ НАЦІОНАЛЬНИЙ УНІВЕРСИТЕТ

ЖАННА МАКСИМЧУК

Завдання для практичних занять з дисципліни «Теорія та практика
синхронного перекладу (англійською мовою)»

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Рекомендовано до друку та затверджено на засіданні кафедри іноземних мов та інформаційно-комунікаційних технологій Західноукраїнського національного університету (протокол N II від 17 квітня 2023р)

Максимчук Ж. С Завдання для практичних занять з дисципліни «Теорія та практика синхронного перекладу (англійською мовою)». – Тернопіль: Вектор, 2023. – с. 30

Практичний курс з предмету "Теорія та практика синхронного перекладу" англійською мовою рекомендовано для підготовки студентів спеціальності 035 «Філологія» освітньої програми «Бізнес-комунікації та переклад» як першу частину навчально-методичного комплексу з дисципліни «Теорія та практика синхронного перекладу» англійською мовою.

Цей курс допоможе студентам у багатоаспектному розвитку навичок та знань у сфері усного перекладу. Він призначений допомогти студентам набутти практичні навички та знання для успішної кар'єри в сфері синхронного перекладу.

Strategies and Techniques of Simultaneous Translation

Translate into Ukrainian. One student needs to read the text and another student is supposed to translate simultaneously.

Six books you didn't know were propaganda

Governments influence a surprising amount of literature. Some of it pretty good

“All art is propaganda”, wrote George Orwell in 1940, “but not all propaganda is art.” Few people would argue with the second part of that aphorism. There is nothing artistic about the dreadful ramblings of “Mein Kampf”. But the first seems true only if you are using a broad definition of propaganda. These days great works of art rarely set out to serve the purposes of a government. They may promote causes, but that is not normally why people esteem them. The books on this list, however, partially vindicate the first part of Orwell’s assertion. Governments or ideological groups either encouraged their authors to write them or promoted their writings for political ends. During the cold war Western intelligence agencies subsidised authors, sometimes very good ones. The cia set up literary magazines in France, Japan and Africa. One purpose was to counter censorship by autocrats. Another was to make global culture friendlier to Western aims. British intelligence services commissioned works of fiction that supported empire. Some writers consciously offered their pens to the state; others did not realise that governments or groups would promote their work. Here are six books, all by authors of merit, that are works of propaganda in one way or another.

Rudyard Kipling’s role as a propagandist for the British empire is often forgotten. British intelligence recruited the author during the first world war to write fiction that sought to undermine Indian nationalism. In 1916 James Dunlop Smith, a British official, sent Kipling the private letters of Indian soldiers fighting in France. Smith asked Kipling to rewrite them to erase any pro-Indian or revolutionary sentiment. The *Saturday Evening Post*, an American magazine, published four between May and June 1917. (Three appeared in the London *Morning Post*.) Kipling put his name to them only when he packaged them together in a book,

“The Eyes of Asia”. The author told Dunlop Smith that in rewriting the letters he had “somewhat amplified the spirit [he] thought [he] saw behind” them. In fact, his revisions were more inventive than that. In turning the soldiers’ epistles into fiction he sanitised them. He excised complaints like “we are like goats tied to a butcher’s stake”, and inserted admiring descriptions of Britain as filled with “gilt furniture, marble, silks, mirrors”. British intelligence liked what it read. Kipling asked Dunlop Smith whether he found any “error in caste or mental outlook in the characters”. It appears he did not. Many readers have admired what one critic (writing about the novel “Kim”) called Kipling’s “positive, detailed and non-stereotypic portrait” of Indian people. His role as a propagandist clouded his vision.

During the cold war the cia sought to undermine censorship in the Soviet Union by covertly promoting the circulation of books and magazines. The snoops sent the novels of Fyodor Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Nabokov. Their favourite author was Boris Pasternak. His novel “Doctor Zhivago” had “great propaganda value”, declared a cia memo in 1958. That may seem like a surprising thing to say about a love story. But the cia was interested not only in the novel’s “thought-provoking nature”, but also in the “circumstances of its publication”. Soviet literary magazines and publishing houses suppressed the book. One cited Pasternak’s “viciousness” and “non-acceptance” of socialism. The Soviets disliked his religious fervour. An Italian literary talent scout smuggled the manuscript of “Dr Zhivago” to Italy, where it was published in 1957. The cia spotted an “opportunity to make Soviet citizens wonder what is wrong with their government, when a fine literary work by the man acknowledged to be the greatest living Russian writer is not even available in his own country”. The spy agency helpfully published the book in Russian. It circulated more than 1,000 copies with help from agents in eastern Europe and distributed them at the World’s Fair in Belgium in 1958. It hoped that publication in the original Russian would pave the way for Pasternak to win a Nobel Prize. He did, but the Soviets obliged him to turn it down. He did not live long enough to see “Dr Zhivago” become a blockbuster film (a still is pictured above) in 1965.

When it was founded in 1947, the cia hired many Yale University seniors. Peter Matthiessen was one of them. The agency sent him to Paris, where he used as his

cover story that he was writing a novel, a story that his cia handler in the city thought “feeble”. Matthiessen did write a novel in Paris, in fact two. “Partisans”, his second, follows Barney Sand, a Paris-based journalist for an American wire service, as he tracks down a former leader of the French Communist Party whom he hopes to interview. The communist had helped Sand escape the Spanish civil war when he was a child. The novel displays such detailed knowledge of the workings of the party that the *Chicago Tribune*, in a review, suggested that its author go back to Moscow. Yet its sympathies are clearly with the West. Sand comes to see communists as self-serving and dishonest; his patriotism grows. The self-consciously literary prose in which “Partisans” is written foreshadows the next step in Matthiessen’s career. He founded the *Paris Review*, a literary magazine, which he also used as a cover to spy on left-wing American artists and intellectuals who had relocated to Paris. The cia thought this a much better cover for his espionage work. “Partisans” is not Matthiessen’s finest work. He is the only writer who has won America’s National Book Award both for fiction and non-fiction. But, as Sand snakes around Paris, he reminds readers that Matthiessen was observing his leftist friends not only for art’s sake.

Azar Nafisi, an Iranian émigrée and professor of English, became famous in 2003 when she published her memoir of the Islamic revolution. “Reading Lolita in Tehran” was an instant hit in America, spending 117 weeks on the *New York Times*’s bestseller list. It’s the riveting story of eight Iranian women who meet secretly to study the novels of Nabokov, Gustave Flaubert and Henry James. Ms Nafisi’s students are children of the Islamic Republic who rebel against its book bans and the “putrid and deceptive hyperbole” of its rhetoric. That description does not apply to “Reading Lolita”, which deserves the admiration it gets. Yet it owes a debt to institutions that are not typical of literary memoirs. Ms Nafisi thanks the Smith Richardson Foundation, which seeks to “advance US interests and values abroad”, for a grant that helped her write the book. It is only through “literature that one can put oneself in someone else’s shoes”, Ms Nafisi writes. For Western readers, “Reading Lolita” is enlightening in the way that literature was for her students. It also supports a harsh judgment of Iran’s theocracy that America continues to hope will be influential.

General recommendations and topics for practical training in simultaneous interpretation:

Exercises for the development of auditory perception:

Use the audio recordings and talk about what you heard.

Try to translate or translate the speech back after listening to shorter familiar texts.

Exercises for the development of instant translation skills:

Use short videos or audio clips and try to translate them into the speaker's language as you listen.

Practice repeating phrases or short statements until students can translate them quickly and accurately.

Thematic exercises:

Use well-known texts from different subjects to practice specific vocabulary and terms.

Organize discussions on various topics, where students will need to instantly translate the statements of other participants.

Exercises to develop concentration:

Give the task of translating longer texts or monologues with a high level of concentration.

Ask questions during the translation to test your understanding and ability to respond instantly.

Exercises to develop technical skills:

Use specialized programs for simultaneous interpretation that allow students to get hands-on experience using technical tools.

What to read to understand international relations

Five books that explain the forces shaping geopolitics

“The world today is undergoing great changes, the likes of which we have not seen for 100 years.” This observation by Xi Jinping, China’s president, may exaggerate, but he is surely right that international relations are changing more now than at any time since the second world war. The “unipolar moment” of 1990-2010, when America had no rivals, is over. China presents a military, economic and technological challenge more pervasive than that mounted by the Soviet Union. In some ways the world is reverting to the disorder of the cold war, except that, unlike

the Soviet Union, China does not champion, or even believe in, universal values. The two sides trade far more than the cold-war antagonists did. Countries allied to neither, such as Brazil, India and Saudi Arabia, are playing more important roles than during the cold war.

Alas, Mr Xi's "great changes" await their historians. Good histories take time to write and the rivalry between America and China is comparatively new. It sharpened in 2022-23, when China's ally, Russia, invaded Ukraine and America imposed sanctions on some technology exports to China. How the rivalry will play out is uncertain. America is caught between a Bidenesque desire for global leadership and Trumpian isolationism; China may precipitate a world war by invading Taiwan; Russia's regime could gain something from its aggression against Ukraine—or implode. Tomorrow's world may be defined less by bipolar rivalry than by several competing spheres of interest, a version of the 19th century's tensions. No wonder historians are holding off. Meanwhile, these five books illuminate separate aspects of today's geopolitics.

Most students, Richard Haass writes, know little about international relations. He has set himself the task of explaining the basics of "global literacy". Mr Haass is well qualified to do that. He advised President George H.W. Bush during the first Gulf war (Mr Bush took his advice not to overthrow Saddam Hussein) and George W. Bush (who rejected that advice by going to war again against Iraq). Mr Haass led the Council on Foreign Relations, America's leading foreign-policy think-tank, for 20 years until June 2023.

His book takes the form of a sequence of memoranda of understanding, non-binding agreements that governments sign. He begins with a crash course on world history, forgivably Euro-centric considering the outsize role that Europe and its American offspring played in the 20th century. He moves on to an equally brisk survey of the world's regions and the roles played by geography, climate, natural resources and culture in determining the fate of nations. His most interesting thoughts come in the book's final quarter, in a discussion of the tools and institutions that great powers have used to try to impose order on a chaotic world: alliance-building, international law, notions of sovereignty and the United Nations. Mr Haass hopes that a better informed American public will support the country's role as the world's policeman. But the main messages of this sensible and slightly

bloodless primer are disheartening. Global order “does not just emerge or continue automatically”. Technocratic management is needed to protect a balance of power from the forces of disunity and violence, but is hard to sustain.

This is the sort of classic text that important people tote around in their briefcases and sometimes even read. Published in 1987, Paul Kennedy’s tome argues that great powers depend upon military might, which in turn depends on economic strength. As they rise their military spending tends to rise. But if they undermine their economies by spending too much, they are doomed to decline. This thesis goes back to Machiavelli if not before. Mr Kennedy’s distinctive contributions are, first, to weave this idea through a detailed account of 500 years of diplomatic and military history and, second, to show its relevance to the world in which he wrote the book. His final chapter is about “the problem of number one in relative decline”. America was in danger of “imperial overreach”, he wrote, because it was spending too much on its armed forces relative to its investment in non-military goals. Mr Kennedy was right about the underlying process, but wrong about the country. Within four years of his book’s publication the Soviet Union collapsed, brought down by the imbalances he was warning against.

Like Mr Haass, Joseph Nye has been both a practitioner and analyst of foreign policy. He served President Bill Clinton in various roles and is now a professor at Harvard University. He coined the phrase “soft power,” and he is sanguine about the staying power of America’s influence. “[W]e are not entering a post-American world,” he writes. The United States will have “primacy in power resources and play the central role in the global balance of power among states”. Mr Nye is defying the pessimism of such books as “The Post-American World” by Fareed Zakaria, which argues that America is in relative decline, and Edward Luce’s “The Retreat of Western Liberalism”, which says that liberal democracies are weakened by economic decay, middle-class frustration and populist rage. Mr Nye is also battling popular gloom: many Americans say their country is falling apart.

In response, he points out that compared with Europe and Japan America is richer than it was in 1990. Its population is younger than either Europe’s or China’s. It spends more on its armed forces than any other country. Although China poses the greatest military and economic challenge, it cannot match America’s alliances: about 60 of the largest 150 countries are American allies, including all the largest

economies (bar China itself). China's rise will affect American influence, Mr Nye admits. America will depend more on persuasion and less on military might. "Leadership is not the same as domination," Mr Nye writes. American leadership is likely to continue, unless Donald Trump wins the election in 2024.

Whereas studies of American power tend to emphasise its decline, most on China are giddy about its rise. "When China Rules the World" by Martin Jacques, a British journalist, accepts a forecast that, measured by market exchange rates, China's economy will overtake America's by the mid 2020s. It predicts that global elites will learn Mandarin, not English. Now economists think that it will take another quarter century at least for China's economy to top America's in size.

Translation of the text from English to native language:

Provide students with an English text that includes a variety of styles and genres (eg news, official document, fiction, etc.). Students will have to perform a simultaneous translation of this text into their native language, taking into account the context and style.

Simultaneous interpretation of speech:

Offer an audio recording of speaking in English on a variety of topics, such as a lecture, interview or discussion. Students will need to perform a simultaneous translation of this speech into their native language.

Work with audiovisual materials:

Submit a short video or film clip in English. Students will have to provide a simultaneous translation of the studied material into their native language, taking into account not only the text, but also the emotions and context of the scene.

Specialized texts:

Suggest a text or speech on a topic relevant to the students' specialization (eg, medicine, engineering, law). Students will be required to perform simultaneous interpretation taking into account terminology and specific expressions.

Real situation:

Suggest a situational case, such as an interview from an event or a real-time event (such as a sports match or press conference). Students should be provided with simultaneous translation into their native language.

The example of the text:

From Gaza to Ukraine, wars and crises are piling up

How diplomats and generals are running out of bandwidth

These are not happy times. An Israel-Hamas war in Gaza threatens to spread across the Middle East, with America and Iran facing off in the background. The Ukraine war, Europe's largest since 1945, shows no sign of ending. And Chinese jets and warships now menace Taiwan in growing numbers and with increasing frequency, with looming elections on the island likely to bring more tumult. Civil conflict in Mali, Myanmar and Sudan has worsened in recent weeks, too.

A concatenation of crises is hardly unprecedented. Sergey Radchenko, a historian, points to the examples of the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez crisis overlapping in 1956, crises in Lebanon and the Taiwan Strait in 1958 and the tumultuous years of 1978-79, when the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan unfolded in quick succession. In 1999 India and Pakistan, newly armed with nuclear missiles, waged a war over Kashmir while nato bombed Serbian forces in Yugoslavia.

But America and its allies cannot intervene as easily or cheaply as they once did. Adversaries such as China and Russia are more assertive, and working more and more together. So too are non-aligned powers, including India and Turkey, which have growing clout to shape distant events and believe that a new and more favourable order is emerging. And the possibility of a war directly between major powers hangs over the world, forcing countries to keep one eye on the future even as they fight fires today.

Massively multiplayer game

The large powers are becoming more polarised on issues where they might once have pushed in the same direction. In the Middle East, for instance, Russia has moved closer to Hamas, tearing up years of careful diplomacy with Israel. China, which in past wars issued bland statements urging de-escalation, has exploited the crisis to criticise America's role in the region. With the exception of strongmen such as Viktor Orban, Hungary's leader, few Western countries talk to Russia any longer. And even dialogue with China is increasingly dominated by threats and warnings rather than by efforts to tackle joint problems like climate change. A meeting planned between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping in California on November 15th may prove a case in point, though there are rumblings of an agreement on military applications of artificial intelligence.

Another shift is growing convergence between America's adversaries. "There really is an axis that is emerging between Russia, China, North Korea and Iran, which rejects their version of the American-led international order," says Stephen Hadley. He served in America's national security council in the 1970s and the Pentagon in the 1980s before becoming national security adviser to George W. Bush in 2005. The war in Ukraine has cemented the partnership between Russia and China. It is not a formal alliance, but the two countries conducted their sixth joint bomber patrol in the western Pacific in the space of just over four years in June. They followed it up with a joint 13,000km naval patrol in the region in August. Iran and North Korea have both supplied Russia with weaponry in return for military technology. The result is greater entanglement. A crisis involving one enemy is increasingly likely to draw in another.

Moreover, each crisis not only involves more enemies, but also more players in general. The leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea have all attended the past two nato summits in Europe. Ukraine's counter-offensive this year could not have happened without an infusion of South Korean shells. Turkey has established itself as a key arms supplier throughout the region, reshaping conflicts in Libya, Syria and Azerbaijan with its military technology and advisers. European countries are planning more intensively how they might respond to a crisis over Taiwan. Crises thus have more moving parts to them.

That reflects a broader shift in the distribution of economic and political power. The idea of “multipolarity”—a term once confined to scholarship, and which refers to a world in which power is concentrated not in two places, as in the cold war, or in one, as in the American-dominated 1990s, but in several—has entered the diplomatic mainstream. In September, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, noted that America, facing the “long-term consequences of Iraq and Afghanistan”—a nod to two failed wars—and relative economic decline, “is adjusting to a multipolar world”.

The argument is debatable. In a recent essay, Jake Sullivan, America’s national security adviser, argued that America is in a stronger position now than it was while mired in those wars. “If the United States were still fighting in Afghanistan,” he wrote, “it is highly likely that Russia would be doing everything it could right now to help the Taliban pin Washington down there, preventing it from focusing its attention on helping Ukraine.” That is plausible. But America’s image is undoubtedly bruised.

A poll conducted in February by the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, found that more than 61% of Russians and Chinese, 51% of Turks and 48% of Indians expect a world defined by either multipolarity or Chinese dominance. In his final state-of-the-union speech in January 2016, Barack Obama, then America’s president, insisted that on “every important international issue, people of the world do not look to Beijing or Moscow to lead—they call us.” Seven years on, things are less clear-cut.

The result of all this is a sense of disorder. America and its allies see growing threats. Russia and China see opportunities. Middle powers, courted by larger ones, but concerned by the growing dysfunction of institutions like the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations, see both. “A kind of anarchy is creeping into international relations,” wrote Shivshankar Menon, who served as India’s foreign secretary and national security adviser, in an essay published last year. It was “not anarchy in the strict sense of the term,” he explained, “but rather the absence of a central organising principle or hegemon.”

That tendency has been compounded by several other trends. One is the climate crisis, which increases the risk of conflict in many parts of the world and, through the green transition, is creating new sources of competition, such as that for critical materials crucial for wind turbines and electric vehicles. The other is the accelerating pace of technological change, with artificial intelligence improving at an exponential rate and with unpredictable consequences. A third is globalisation, which knits crises together in new ways. A war over Taiwan, for instance, would cause acute disruption to the semiconductor industry and thus to the world economy.

From dawn to dawn

The new world disorder is putting the institutional capacity of America and its allies under stress while stretching their military capabilities. Start by considering the institutional pressure. The cold war, Mr Hadley argues, was an “organised world”. There were global challenges, he acknowledges, but many were subsets of the larger superpower struggle. “For post-cold-war national security advisers,” he says, “it’s more like cooking on an eight-burner stove with every burner having a pot, and every pot just about to boil over.”

A world in which more crises occur together poses two sorts of challenges to the leaders and diplomats tasked with managing them. One is the tactical problem of fighting several fires at once. Crises tend to have a centralising effect, says a former senior British diplomat, with prime ministers or presidents taking personal charge of issues that might otherwise be scattered among foreign and defence ministries. Even in large and powerful states, bureaucratic bandwidth can be surprisingly limited.

Diplomats, immersed in crises, often perceive that their own times are unusually chaotic. Baroness Catherine Ashton, who was the European Union’s de facto foreign minister from 2009 to 2014, points out that she was dealing with the Arab spring, Iran’s nuclear programme and the Serbia-Kosovo dispute at the same time. “I can remember very clearly, when the Ukraine crisis began,” she says, referring to a revolution in Kyiv in 2014, “that I just didn’t know if we would have the bandwidth for all of this.”

One issue is that competition has turned to conflict. The war in Ukraine has been especially debilitating for diplomacy. Baroness Ashton recalls that when the Ukraine crisis began in 2014, her negotiating team for nuclear talks with Iran in Vienna included Russia's deputy foreign minister. She would travel to Kyiv to condemn Russia's meddling and he to Moscow to condemn the European Union. "Then we'd fly back and all sit down and carry on with the Iran talks." Such fleet-footed compartmentalisation would now be impossible.

America's national security council is a bare-bones operation, in part because Congress is loth to fund White House staff. In an essay published in 2016, Julianne Smith, now America's envoy to nato, recalled her time as deputy national security adviser to Mr Biden when he was vice-president. "A typical day would often involve four to six hours of back-to-back meetings on anything from Syria to cybersecurity to North Korea," followed by 150 to 500 emails per day. "My ability to plan, think beyond the next day in the office, or significantly deepen my knowledge of any single issue was virtually non-existent."

The expectation that top officials represent their country in a crisis often puts enormous pressure on a handful of people. Antony Blinken, America's secretary of state, has spent almost every waking hour shuttling between Middle Eastern capitals over the past six weeks. He recently flew from the Middle East to Tokyo, for a meeting of g7 foreign ministers, then to India, and on to San Francisco. Mr Sullivan is also spread thinly.

Of pens and swords

Even if diplomats can successfully spin multiple plates, the concurrence of crises presents a larger, strategic problem when it comes to military power. The current crisis in the Middle East shows that military power is a scarce resource—like diplomatic bandwidth. Even in recent years, Pentagon officials would boast that they were finally rebalancing naval power from the Middle East to Asia, after two decades of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, under pressure of events, the trend is reversing.

When the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower* and its escorts entered the Red Sea on November 4th it was the first time an American aircraft-carrier had operated in the Middle East for two years. The exercises it conducted earlier with the *USS Gerald*

R. Ford marked an unusually large show of force. If the war in Gaza drags on or widens, American naval forces may need to choose between sticking around, creating gaps in other parts of the world, including Asia, or emboldening Iran.

Meanwhile, Western officials increasingly think the war in Ukraine could drag on for another five years, with neither Russia nor Ukraine prepared to give in, but neither capable of breaking the stalemate. As the 2020s roll on, the red lights begin to flash. Many American intelligence officials, and some Asian ones, believe that the risk of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is greatest in a window at the end of this decade. Too early, and China is not ready. Too late, and China faces the prospect of demographic decline and a new generation of Western military technology.

Even without a war, the West's military capacity will come under enormous pressure in the coming years. The war in Ukraine has been a reminder of both just how much ammunition is consumed in big wars, but also how meagre Western armouries—and their means of replenishment—really are. America is dramatically upping its production of 155mm artillery shells. Even then, its output in 2025 is likely to be lower than that of Russia in 2024.

The wars in Ukraine and Gaza illustrate these stresses. Israel and Ukraine are fighting two different sorts of war. Ukraine needs long-range missiles to strike Crimea, armoured vehicles to allow infantry to advance in the face of shrapnel, and demining gear to punch through vast minefields. Israel wants air-dropped smart bombs, including bunker busters, and interceptors for its Iron Dome air-defence system, which are being fired at a prodigious rate. But there is overlap, too.

Last year America dipped into its stockpile of shells in Israel to arm Ukraine. In October it had to divert some Ukraine-bound shells to Israel. Both countries also use the Patriot missile-defence system, which takes out planes and larger missiles. So too do other allies in the Middle East: on October 19th Saudi Arabia used a Patriot battery to intercept Israel-bound missiles launched from Yemen. Ukraine's consumption of interceptors is likely to rise sharply over the winter as Russia, having stockpiled missiles for months, unleashes sustained barrages against Ukraine's power grid.

America can probably satisfy both of its friends for the moment. In recent weeks, France and Germany have both pledged to increase assistance to Ukraine. But if

either war—or both—drags on, there will be a pinch. “As time goes on, there will be trade-offs as certain key systems are diverted to Israel,” writes Mark Cancian of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, a think-tank in Washington. “A few systems that Ukraine needs for its counter-offensive may not be available in the numbers that Ukraine would like.”

The bigger problem is that, realistically, America could not arm itself and its allies at the same time. “If us production lines are already struggling to keep pace with the exigencies of arming Ukraine,” notes Iskander Rehman of Johns Hopkins University in a recent paper on protracted wars, “they would be completely overwhelmed in the event of an actual protracted, peer-to-peer conflict with an adversary such as China.”

These challenges point to deeper tensions in American defence strategy. From 1992 onward American military planners held to what was known as the “two-war” standard. America’s armed forces had to be ready to fight two simultaneous medium-sized wars against regional powers—think Iraq or Iran—rather than simply a single big war. In 2018 the Trump administration changed this to a “one-war” standard: in practice, a commitment to be able to fight either a war in Europe or in Asia, but not both at the same time. Mr Biden’s administration stuck with this approach.

The aim was to instil discipline in the Pentagon and to bring ends in line with means: America’s defence budget is virtually flat in real terms, while Chinese defence spending has soared. But the risk, argued critics, was that the one-war standard would tempt enemies to open a second front—which could then force America to either back down or resort to unappealing options, like nuclear threats.

Too many plates

What risks do America and its allies run by being so stretched across diplomatic and military realms? If the war in Ukraine stays an open sore in Europe and the Middle East remains ablaze, the West will struggle gravely should another serious crisis erupt. One risk is that adversaries simply capitalise on chaos elsewhere for their own ends. If America were bogged down in a Pacific war, for instance, Iran would surely feel more confident of getting away with a dash for nuclear weapons.

Even more worrying is the prospect of active collusion. European military planners give weight to the possibility that Russia might conduct menacing manoeuvres during a crisis over Taiwan in order to divert American attention and tie down its allies, preventing them from lending a hand in Asia. As in the cold war, each crisis, no matter how parochial or trivial, might come to be seen as a test of American or Chinese power, drawing each country in.

Then there are the surprises. Western intelligence agencies have their hands full watching China and Russia. Few expected Hamas to throw the Middle East back into turmoil as it did on October 7th. Civil wars and insurgencies in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia and Sudan have all been neglected, diplomatically, even as Russian influence in the Sahel continues to grow. Meanwhile on November 10th dozens of Chinese ships circled Philippine vessels, blasting one with water cannon, as the latter attempted to resupply an outpost on Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, which China claims as its own. If the confrontations worsen, the terms of America's defence treaty with the Philippines may oblige it to intervene.

Amid disorder, strategists talk about the importance of "walking and chewing gum". It is a uniquely American metaphor that once referred to performing two trivial activities at once, and now explains the importance of geopolitical multi-tasking. Others are available. In his forthcoming book, "To Run the World", Mr Radchenko, the historian, quotes Zhou Enlai, China's premier, identifying America's predicament in 1964: "If there were just a few more Congos in Africa, a few more Vietnams in Asia, a few more Cubas in Latin America, then America would have to spread ten fingers to ten more places...we can chop them off one by one."

Another example of the text:

The commander-in-chief of Ukraine's armed forces on how to win the war

Technology is the key as the war becomes "positional", says Valery Zaluzhny
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 provoked a global security crisis. The assault on democracy by a morally sick imperial power in the heart of Europe has tilted the balance of power in other parts of the world, including the Middle East and Asia-Pacific. The failure of multilateral bodies such as the un and

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe to maintain order means that Ukraine can only restore its territorial integrity by military force.

Ukrainians have shown their willingness to lay down soul and body for their freedom. Ukraine not only halted an invasion by a far stronger enemy but liberated much of its territory. However, the war is now moving to a new stage: what we in the military call “positional” warfare of static and attritional fighting, as in the first world war, in contrast to the “manoeuvre” warfare of movement and speed. This will benefit Russia, allowing it to rebuild its military power, eventually threatening Ukraine’s armed forces and the state itself. What is the way out?

Basic weapons, such as missiles and shells, remain essential. But Ukraine’s armed forces need key military capabilities and technologies to break out of this kind of war. The most important one is air power. Control of the skies is essential to large-scale ground operations. At the start of the war we had 120 warplanes. Of these, only one-third were usable.

Russia’s air force has taken huge losses and we have destroyed over 550 of its air-defence systems, but it maintains a significant advantage over us and continues to build new attack squadrons. That advantage has made it harder for us to advance. Russia’s air-defence systems increasingly prevent our planes from flying. Our defences do the same to Russia. So Russian drones have taken over a large part of the role of manned aviation in terms of reconnaissance and air strikes.

Drones must be part of our answer, too. Ukraine needs to conduct massive strikes using decoy and attack drones to overload Russia’s air-defence systems. We need to hunt down Russian drones using our own hunter drones equipped with nets. We must use signal-emitting decoys to attract Russian glide bombs. And we need to blind Russian drones’ thermal cameras at night using stroboscopes.

This points to our second priority: electronic warfare (ew), such as jamming communication and navigation signals. EW is the key to victory in the drone war. Russia modernised its ew forces over the past decade, creating a new branch of its army and building 60 new types of equipment. It outdoes us in this area: 65% of our jamming platforms at the start of the war were produced in Soviet times.

We have already built many of our own electronic protection systems, which can prevent jamming. But we also need more access to electronic intelligence from our allies, including data from assets that collect signals intelligence, and expanded production lines for our anti-drone ew systems within Ukraine and abroad. We need to get better at conducting electronic warfare from our drones, across a wider range of the radio spectrum, while avoiding accidental suppression of our own drones.

The fourth task is mine-breaching technology. We had limited and outdated equipment for this at the start of the war. But even Western supplies, such as Norwegian mine-clearing tanks and rocket-powered mine-clearing devices, have proved insufficient given the scale of Russian minefields, which stretch back 20km in places. When we do breach minefields, Russia quickly replenishes them by firing new mines from a distance.

Technology is the answer. We need radar-like sensors that use invisible pulses of light to detect mines in the ground and smoke-projection systems to conceal the activities of our de-mining units. We can use jet engines from decommissioned aircraft, water cannons or cluster munitions to breach mine barriers without digging into the ground. New types of tunnel excavators, such as a robot which uses plasma torches to bore tunnels, can also help.

My fifth and final priority is to build up our reserves. Russia has failed to capitalise on its hefty manpower advantage because Vladimir Putin is worried that a general mobilisation might spark a political crisis, and because Russia cannot train and equip enough people. However, our capacity to train reserves on our own territory is also limited. We cannot easily spare soldiers who are deployed to the front. Moreover, Russia can strike training centres. And there are gaps in our legislation that allow citizens to evade their responsibilities.

We are trying to fix these problems. We are introducing a unified register of draftees, and we must expand the category of citizens who can be called up for training or mobilisation. We are also introducing a “combat internship”, which involves placing newly mobilised and trained personnel in experienced front-line units to prepare them.

Russia should not be underestimated. It has suffered heavy losses and expended a lot of ammunition. But it will have superiority in weapons, equipment, missiles and ammunition for a considerable time. Its defence industry is increasing its output, despite unprecedented sanctions. Our nato partners are dramatically increasing their production capacity, too. But it takes at least a year to do this and, in some cases, such as aircraft and command-and-control systems, two years.

A positional war is a prolonged one that carries enormous risks to Ukraine's armed forces and to its state. If Ukraine is to escape from that trap, we will need all these things: air superiority, much-improved electronic-warfare and counter-battery capabilities, new mine-breaching technology and the ability to mobilise and train more reserves. We also need to focus on modern command and control—so we can visualise the battlefield more effectively than Russia and make decisions more quickly—and on rationalising our logistics while disrupting Russia's with longer-range missiles. New, innovative approaches can turn this war of position back into one of manoeuvre.

Tasks for Independent Work on Simultaneous Translation

Task 1: Simultaneous interpretation of speech:

Offer an audio recording of speaking in English on a variety of topics, such as a lecture, interview or discussion. Students will need to perform a simultaneous translation of this speech into their native language.

Real situation:

Suggest a situational case, such as an interview from an event or a real-time event (such as a sports match or press conference). Students should be provided with simultaneous translation into their native language.

Specialized texts:

Suggest a text or speech on a topic relevant to the students' specialization (eg, medicine, engineering, law). Students will be required to perform simultaneous interpretation taking into account terminology and specific expressions.

A list of terminology from the article:

Counter-offensive: A military strategy in which forces respond to an offensive action initiated by an enemy.

Stalemate: A situation in which neither side in a conflict is able to make progress, resulting in a deadlock.

Technological leap: A significant advancement in technology that can change the dynamics of a conflict.

Brigades: Military units typically consisting of several battalions.

Minefields: Areas containing explosive mines, used as a defensive measure in warfare.

Artillery: Large-caliber firearms used in warfare, such as cannons or heavy guns.

Drones: Unmanned aerial vehicles used for various purposes, including reconnaissance and combat.

Sensors: Devices that detect and measure physical properties, often used in modern military equipment.

Precision weapons: Weapons designed to hit specific targets with a high degree of accuracy.

Innovation: The introduction of new ideas, methods, or technologies.

Electronic warfare: The use of electromagnetic signals to disrupt or disable enemy communication and radar systems.

Demining equipment: Tools and devices used to clear areas of explosive mines.

Long-range missile systems: Missile systems capable of reaching targets at a significant distance.

Blitzkrieg: A form of warfare characterized by surprise, speed, and intense coordinated attacks.

Legitimacy: The state of being in accordance with the law or accepted principles.

Atacms missiles: Advanced Tactical Missile Systems, a type of guided missile.

Trench warfare: A type of land warfare using occupied fighting lines consisting largely of trenches.

Attritional trench war: A prolonged conflict characterized by gradual wearing down of forces in trench warfare.

Feudal state: A social and economic system characterized by a hierarchical structure and land ownership.

Gunpowder: Metaphorically used here to signify a solution or innovation that can change the course of the war.

The example of the text:

Ukraine's commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia

General Valery Zaluzhny admits the war is at a stalemate

Five months into its counter-offensive, Ukraine has managed to advance by just 17 kilometres. Russia fought for ten months around Bakhmut in the east “to take a town six by six kilometres”. Sharing his first comprehensive assessment of the campaign with *The Economist* in an interview this week, Ukraine's commander-in-chief, General Valery Zaluzhny, says the battlefield reminds him of the great conflict of a century ago. “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he says. The general concludes that it would take a massive technological leap to break the deadlock. “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”

The course of the counter-offensive has undermined Western hopes that Ukraine could use it to demonstrate that the war is unwinnable, forcing Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, to negotiate. It has also undercut General Zaluzhny's assumption that he could stop Russia by bleeding its troops. “That was my mistake. Russia has lost at least 150,000 dead. In any other country such casualties would have stopped

the war.” But not in Russia, where life is cheap and where Mr Putin’s reference points are the first and second world wars, in which Russia lost tens of millions.

An army of Ukraine’s standard ought to have been able to move at a speed of 30km a day as it breached Russian lines. “If you look at nato’s text books and at the maths which we did, four months should have been enough time for us to have reached Crimea, to have fought in Crimea, to return from Crimea and to have gone back in and out again,” General Zaluzhny says sardonically. Instead he watched his troops get stuck in minefields on the approaches to Bakhmut in the east, his Western-supplied equipment getting pummelled by Russian artillery and drones. The same story unfolded on the offensive’s main thrust in the south, where inexperienced brigades immediately ran into trouble.

“First I thought there was something wrong with our commanders, so I changed some of them. Then I thought maybe our soldiers are not fit for purpose, so I moved soldiers in some brigades,” says General Zaluzhny. When those changes failed to make a difference, the general told his staff to dig out a book he once saw as a student. Its title was “Breaching Fortified Defence Lines”. It was published in 1941 by a Soviet major-general, P.S. Smirnov, who analysed the battles of the first world war. “And before I got even halfway through it, I realised that is exactly where we are because just like then, the level of our technological development today has put both us and our enemies in a stupor.”

That thesis, he says, was borne out as he went to the front line in Avdiivka, also in the east, where Russia has recently advanced by a few hundred metres over several weeks by throwing in two of its armies. “On our monitor screens the day I was there we saw 140 Russian machines ablaze—destroyed within four hours of coming within firing range of our artillery.” Those fleeing were chased by “first-person-view” drones, remote-controlled and carrying explosive charges that their operators simply crash into the enemy. The same picture unfolds when Ukrainian troops try to advance. General Zaluzhny describes a battlefield in which modern sensors can identify any concentration of forces, and modern precision weapons can destroy it. “The simple fact is that we see everything the enemy is doing and they see everything we are doing. In order for us to break this deadlock

we need something new, like the gunpowder which the Chinese invented and which we are still using to kill each other,” he says.

This time, however, the decisive factor will be not a single new invention, but will come from combining all the technical solutions that already exist, he says. In a By Invitation article written for *The Economist* by General Zaluzhny, as well as in an essay shared with the newspaper, he urges innovation in drones, electronic warfare, anti-artillery capabilities and demining equipment, as well as in the use of robotics.

Western allies have been overly cautious in supplying Ukraine with their latest technology and more powerful weapons. Joe Biden, America’s president, set objectives at the start of Russia’s invasion: to ensure that Ukraine was not defeated and that America was not dragged into confrontation with Russia. This means that arms supplied by the West have been sufficient in sustaining Ukraine in the war, but not enough to allow it to win. General Zaluzhny is not complaining: “They are not obliged to give us anything, and we are grateful for what we have got, but I am simply stating the facts.”

Crimea, the general believes, remains Mr Putin’s greatest vulnerability. His legitimacy rests on having brought it back to Russia in 2014. Over the past few months, Ukraine has taken the war into the peninsula, which remains critical to the logistics of the conflict. “It must know that it is part of Ukraine and that this war is happening there.” On October 30th Ukraine struck Crimea with American-supplied long-range atacms missiles for the first time.

General Zaluzhny is desperately trying to prevent the war from settling into the trenches. “The biggest risk of an attritional trench war is that it can drag on for years and wear down the Ukrainian state,” he says. In the first world war, politics interfered before technology could make a difference. Four empires collapsed and a revolution broke out in Russia.

Mr Putin is counting on a collapse in Ukrainian morale and Western support. There is no question in General Zaluzhny’s mind that a long war favours Russia, which has a population three times and an economy ten times the size of Ukraine. “Let’s be honest, it’s a feudal state where the cheapest resource is human life. And for

us...the most expensive thing we have is our people,” he says. For now he has enough soldiers. But the longer the war goes on, the harder it will be to sustain. “We need to look for this solution, we need to find this gunpowder, quickly master it and use it for a speedy victory. Because sooner or later we are going to find that we simply don’t have enough people to fight.”

The example of the text:

Ukraine faces a long war. A change of course is needed

Its backers should pray for a speedy victory—but plan for a long struggle

The war in Ukraine has repeatedly confounded expectations. It is now doing so again. The counter-offensive that began in June was based on the hope that Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and after training in Germany, would recapture enough territory to put their leaders in a strong position at any subsequent negotiations.

This plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and breaches of Russian defences near Robotyne, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory that Russia occupied in June. The 1,000km front line has barely shifted. Ukraine’s army could still make a breakthrough in the coming weeks, triggering the collapse of brittle Russian forces. But on the evidence of the past three months, it would be a mistake to bank on that. Asking for a ceasefire or peace talks is pointless. Vladimir Putin shows no sign of wanting to negotiate and, even if he did, could not be trusted to stick to a deal. He is waiting for the West to tire and hoping that Donald Trump is re-elected. Mr Putin needs war to underpin his domestic dictatorship; any ceasefire would simply be a pause to re-arm and get ready to attack again. If Ukrainians stop fighting, they could lose their country.

Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are coming to realise that this will be a grinding war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington this week for talks. “I have to be ready for the long war,” he told *The Economist*. But unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready; nor are its Western partners. Both are still

fixated on the counter-offensive. They need to rethink Ukraine's military strategy and how its economy is run. Instead of aiming to "win" and then rebuild, the goal should be to ensure that Ukraine has the staying power to wage a long war—and can thrive despite it.

The first recalibration is military. Ukraine's soldiers are exhausted; many of its finest have been killed. Despite conscription, it lacks the manpower to sustain a permanent large-scale counter-offensive. It needs to husband resources, and to change the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russia. Ukraine's tech-savvy entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: Ukrainian drones recently destroyed Russian warships; its missiles seem to have damaged a big air-defence system in Crimea. Many more strikes are likely, to degrade Russia's military infrastructure and deny its navy sanctuary in the Black Sea. Don't expect a knockout blow. Russia has also scaled up its drone production. Still, Ukraine can hit back when Russia bombs it, and perhaps even deter some attacks.

Alongside this offensive capability, Ukraine needs to boost its resilience. As well as heavy weaponry, it needs help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight: humdrum repairs, reliable supplies of artillery and training. More than anything, a long war requires better air defence. Ukraine cannot thrive if Russia blasts infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has for the past 18 months. Kyiv is a surprisingly vibrant city because it has effective defences against non-stop aerial attacks. The same set-up is needed for other cities, which is why squadrons of f-16s and more missile-defence systems are essential.

Glossary

Simultaneous Interpretation: The real-time translation of spoken language into another language, often delivered concurrently with the speaker's speech.

Counter-offensive: A military strategy where forces respond to an enemy's offensive action with an offensive of their own.

Stalemate: A situation in which neither side in a conflict can make progress, resulting in a deadlock.

Note-taking: The practice of jotting down key points and information to aid memory during consecutive interpretation.

Artillery: Large-caliber firearms used in warfare, including cannons and heavy guns.

Drones: Unmanned aerial vehicles used for various purposes, such as reconnaissance and combat.

Electronic Warfare: The use of electromagnetic signals to disrupt or disable enemy communication and radar systems.

Precision Weapons: Weapons designed to hit specific targets with a high degree of accuracy.

Innovation: The introduction of new ideas, methods, or technologies.

Long-range Missile Systems: Missile systems capable of reaching targets at a significant distance.

Blitzkrieg: A form of warfare characterized by surprise, speed, and intense coordinated attacks.

Legitimacy: The state of being in accordance with the law or accepted principles.

Trench Warfare: A type of land warfare using occupied fighting lines consisting largely of trenches.

Feudal State: A social and economic system characterized by a hierarchical structure and land ownership.

Attritional Trench War: A prolonged conflict characterized by gradual wearing down of forces in trench warfare.

Voice and Speech Quality: The characteristics of spoken language, crucial for interpreters in simultaneous interpretation.

Pragmatics: The study of language use in context, including how context influences the meaning of words.

Community Interpreting: Interpreting services provided in community settings, involving interactions between individuals who speak different languages.

Critical Link: An international organization that focuses on community interpreting and translation.

Cognitive Processes: Mental activities such as perception, memory, and problem-solving, crucial for interpreters in simultaneous interpretation.

Psychological Aspects of Interpretation: The study of the mental processes and factors influencing interpreters' performance.

Research Methods in Translation and Interpreting Studies: Approaches and techniques used to investigate and study various aspects of translation and interpreting.

Consecutive Interpretation: A mode of interpretation where the speaker pauses to allow the interpreter to convey the message in the target language.

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