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HUMAN MORALS IN THE RETROSPECTIVE OF COGNITIVE- ANTHROPOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

The article is devoted to the problem of morality, from ancient times to the present. An analysis of historical approaches to understanding morality. It is proved that important in the modern transformation of the conceptual foundations of morality is the man himself, whose cognitive behavior in all ages is based on historical, legal and religious programs, which unite and organize it. Relevant strategies of such programs reflect their separate, inherent only in them, cognitive representations, which not only reflect moral ideas about reality, but also are able to create a «new reality», distorting the old. Emphasis is placed on the need to consider this problem, due to the need to establish a causal relationship between morality and law.

Keywords: morality, law, moral ideas, human morality, good, evil.

Горєлова В.

Мораль людини в ретроспективі когнітивно-антропологічного аналізу

Розглянуто проблему моралі, починаючи від давніх часів до сьогодення. Проведено аналіз історичних підходів до розуміння моралі. Доведено, що важливим у сучасній трансформації концептуальних засад моралі постає сама людина, когнітивна поведінка якої завжди будується на історичних, правових та релігійних програмах, які саме її організують та впорядковують. Відповідні стратегії таких програм відображають свої окремі, властиві лише їм, когнітивні репрезентації, які не лише відображають моральні уявлення про дійсність, а й здатні створювати «нову дійсність», спотворюючи стару. Наголошується на необхідності розгляду цієї проблеми, що зумовлено потребою встановлення причинно-наслідкової взаємозалежності моралі та правових норм. Трансформація моралі відбувається протягом всієї історії людства, відображаючи зміни в праві на кожному етапі розвитку людства, адже формується певне переосмислення моральних цінностей у поєднанні з ідеологічними перетвореннями, що відбуваються в суспільстві. Змінюється і розуміння того, що є моральним. На сьогодні необхідність розгляду цієї проблеми зумовлено потребою встановлення причинно-наслідкової взаємозалежності між мораллю людини та соціальними, правовими та культурними факторами. Наголошено на тому, що в сучасному суспільстві взагалі відсутні гарантії чи раціональні шляхи до моральної згоди в суспільстві, не існує можливостей та способів встановити чітку ієрархію переваг серед моральних вимог. Сучасний стан моралі дослідники визначають як занедбаний. Можна сказати, що настала епоха когнітивного викривлення моралі – тобто поступове та постійне відхилення від моральних устоїв, що виявляється в поведінці і мисленні осіб. Ці збої обумовлені такими причинами: упередженнями, стереотипами, не здатністю аналізувати інформацію, байдужістю. Мораль новітнього часу – це філософсько-правова химера, адже вона починається з рівня особистого вибору поведінки у вільному просторі, межі якого можуть бути встановлені лише правовими нормами. Концептуальні засади моральних законів на сьогодні все більш схильні до появи «моралі десь посередині», «моралі узгодженості» або «нейтральної моралі». Цей феномен народився на терені «правової лояльності» та толерантності, що стало наслідком остаточного розмиву цілісності моральних постулатів, що були сформовані впродовж цілих століть.

Ключові слова: мораль, право, моральні уявлення, мораль людини, добро, зло.

Горєлова В.

Мораль человека в ретроспективе когнитивно-антропологического анализа

Статья посвящена рассмотрению проблемы морали, начиная от древних времен до современности. Проводится анализ исторических подходов к пониманию морали. Доказано, что важным в современной трансформации концептуальных основ морали возникает сам человек, когнитивная поведение которой во все века строится на исторических, правовых и религиозных программах, которые именно ее организуют и упорядочивают. Соответствующие стратегии таких программ отражают свои отдельные, присущие только им, когнитивные репрезентации, которые не только отражают нравственные представления о действительности, но и способны создавать «новую действительность», искажая старую. Подчеркивается необходимость

рассмотрения этой проблемы, что обусловлено необходимостью установления причинно-следственной взаимосвязи морали и правовых норм. Трансформация морали происходит на протяжении всей истории человечества, отражая изменения в праве на каждом этапе развития человечества, ведь наступает определенное переосмысление нравственных ценностей в сочетании с идеологическими преобразованиями, происходящими в обществе. Меняется и понимание того, что является моральным. На сегодня необходимость рассмотрения этой проблемы обусловлено необходимостью установления причинно-следственной взаимосвязи между моралью человека и социальными, правовыми и культурными факторами. В статье отмечается, что в современном обществе вообще отсутствуют гарантии или рациональные пути к моральной согласии в обществе, не существует возможностей и способов установить четкую иерархию предпочтений среди моральных требований. Современное состояние морали исследователи определяют как заброшенный. Можно сказать, что наступила эпоха когнитивного порче нравов – то есть постепенное и постоянное отклонение от моральных устоев, что проявляется в поведении и мышлении человек. Эти сбои обусловлены рядом причин: предубеждениями, стереотипами, не способностью анализировать информацию, равнодушием. Мораль новейшего времени – это философско-правовая химера, ведь она начинается с уровня личного выбора поведения в свободном пространстве, границы которого могут быть установлены только правовыми нормами. Концептуальные основы нравственных законов, на сегодня, все более склонны к появлению «морали где-то посередине», «морали согласованности» или «нейтральной морали». Этот феномен родился на территории «правового лояльности» и толерантности, что стало следствием окончательного размыва целостности нравственных постулатов, которые были сформированы в течение целых веков..

Ключевые слова: мораль, право, нравственные представления, мораль человека, добро, зло.

Formulation of the problem. The birth and development of morality probably begins with the first man, because the understanding of good and evil is inherent in man himself and is its distinguishing feature from other living beings on Earth. The establishment and transformation of morality occur throughout the history of mankind because at every stage of human development there is a certain rethinking of moral values. However, there have always been significant ideological differences in the understanding of what is moral. Today, the need to consider this problem is due to the need to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between human morality and social, legal and cultural factors.

Analysis of recent research and publications. In the development of morality, we have conditionally identified several periods: ancient times, the Middle Ages, pre-revolutionary, Soviet and modern periods. The works of researchers of the modern period are mainly the works of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists: A.M. McIntyre, M. Halbwachs, D.O. Brink, A. Fuchs, Carl Gustav Jung and others.

Part of the general problem has not been solved previously. Anthropological ideas about the variability of moral ideas or the permanence of its postulates, about the moral progress or regress of mankind can be analyzed only by historical example. In the domestic scientific legal thought, there is no sufficiently thorough consideration of the historical process of moral development, which requires proper coverage.

Formulating the goals of the article. Consideration of the historical retrospective of cognitive-anthropological analysis of morality and some trends in its development, plays a significant role in the legal field, because the whole system of law is based on the understanding of morality.

Presentation of the main research material. Anthropological ideas about the variability of moral ideas or the permanence of its postulates, about the moral progress or regress of mankind can be analyzed only by historical example. The reference to the Old Testament, as the oldest document in the world, allows us to testify to the following: a moral person is either a pure God-fearing child or a wise old man endowed with all virtues (Abel, Abram, Lot, Job, Tabitha, prophets: Jeremiah, Hosea, Joel, Amos, Micah, Zechariah, etc.) or a bloodthirsty warrior, filled with the search for truth, love of truth, and the desire to atone for his sins (Moses, Samson, King David, etc.). Evil, debauchery and cruelty under the Old Testament inevitably lead to the death not only of the individual but also of individual cities, settlements and even the whole world [1]. Christian morality permeates the ancient world with reflections on the meaning of life.

The next circle of the concept of morality is covered in the man of the New Testament, starting with the first lines of the list of names of all ancestors, starting with the first man Adam – the ancestors of St. Joseph – the betrothed. The concept of «moral memory» further permeates all the ancient communicative knowledge and human action, creating a huge field for his reflection on the contradictions, criticism and constant justification of the positive moral. In addition, moral postulates become legal norms, as can be seen in the Ten Commandments of the Lord, for the violation of which it was possible to punish not by special bodies, but by any person [2]. In the words of John Chrysostom, Archbishop of Constantinople (347 - 438) «obtaining laws is a matter of mercy, compassion,

grace» [3, p. 94], that is, the law in fact can not contradict morality, and obtaining the law is an indisputable benefit and a reminder of morality. Regarding the inseparability of the connection between the category «morality – law – memory», John Chrysostom reminds that «if a good law is forgotten, a person will grow up with sin, lawlessness and dirt» [3, p. 98]. Thus, Christian morality professes the eternal truth that God has and that is love, such a truth is not born in dispute and does not exist «somewhere in the middle». True love does not bring evil and pain, it creates law and this law based on love is a moral law.

Recognizing two virtues: mental (intellectual) and moral, Aristotle believed that the first arises from exercise in learning, and the second arises from habit. Aristotle in his work «Ethics» tries to prove that none of the charities in man can be innate, but only received: «because legislators, accustoming to the laws of citizens, make them virtuous, because such is the desire of any legislator». Hence (according to Aristotle) – every decency arises, develops and is neutralized, and the repetition of the same deeds creates a moral foundation. Aristotle's idea of a person's responsibility for moral or mental incapacity remains cognitive-revolutionary at all times. Leaving the critique of this view from psychology and philosophy, in our opinion, the reasonableness of this idea follows precisely from the origins of the Aristotelian approach to the acquisition (teaching) of charity (morality). Otherwise, the correctness of bringing a person to justice for something independent of him would seem doubtful [4, p. 20, 35].

Morality according to Thomas Aquinas is a phenomenal combination of Christian and Aristotelian morality. According to his perfectionist theory, the good for man is to seek good and avoid evil. In this regard, morality according to F. Aquinas permeates all three types of laws: eternal (God's law), natural law (reflection of eternal law in intelligent beings), human law (state laws that keep people from evil through force and fear). He also divided morality into one that reflects the relationship between people and inner morality, which means a person's attitude to himself, his passions, desires [5, p. 57, 61].

John Locke tries to use the formula to prove that man is not only the unity of physical and mental, but also – it is his memory of bad and good, from which it is concluded that the existence of moral and metaphysical parallels of human nature [6, p. 78], which in turn gives reason to doubt which of the existing moral theories can be considered justified if it is rightly proved that there is no concept of «correct personality» [7, p. 98]. We can say that such arguments prove the identity of morality to human nature.

However, the unity of construction according to J. Locke «physical body – soul-memory – morality» gives birth to thoughts on the next mandatory component of man – the moral responsibility of the person to himself, the pangs of conscience and soul generated by his memory.

Exploring the personality as a multifaceted component, the philosopher D. Parfit, in my opinion, becomes closer to modern philosophy, because he notes that the pangs of conscience – is an unnecessary and unnecessary burden [8, p. 168] The similarity of the position is also noted in the philosophy of G.O. Grotia, according to which justice (morality) is fiction, because a person is primarily for his own benefit and it is impossible to teach him to think and act in agreement with another [9, p. 45].

According to the theory of I. Kant, the moral law can be obtained only through philosophy [10, p. 49] with which many scholars agree, and this is understandable, since only the mind can create morality, but, in our opinion, today's philosophy sometimes goes beyond the Christian good and thus distorts the understanding of morality. According to Spinoza's philosophy, morality is born of good [11, p. 43], but in this case, the human mind, in turn, must be pure for true knowledge of what is good.

We see an extended vision of morality in the philosophy of I. Bentham (morality in action) and J. Mill (morality in rules), the purpose of which is to obtain pleasure and happiness. Moreover, I. Bentham emphasizes the condition of the general usefulness of morality [12, p. 49], and J. Mill – on the need to focus on the norms developed by society [13, p. 187]. In addition, J. Mill, exploring morality in the field of human primordial desire for a happy life, rightly sees moral universality as a kind of anthropological reflection of human activity.

Historically, morality has been identified with such categories as honor and dignity. For example, in the Middle Ages on the battlefield was dominated by a knightly army, guided by the provisions of the code of honor and noble dignity (but only relatively equal in origin to the enemy). The role of protector of the civilian population was first taken over by the church (although in the first place the priests tried to protect themselves and those on whom their wealth depended). In 989, a council of Catholic hierarchs was held in Sharr Abbey, which proclaimed the immunity of the civilian population during hostilities and decided that those guilty of looting peasant houses and churches, stealing cattle and killing unarmed people would be excommunicated [14, p. 266].

Another view of morality – the bourgeois rationalist model of morality, was widespread in Western Europe, whose representatives (F. Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, etc.) tried to establish a new, vague argument, but only

replaced by a metaphor model of morality «superman», which has nothing like it. with the Christian morality of the Orthodox population of historical Russia and could not be accepted by our ancestors. Similarly, the emotional – sensory moral theory of emotivism – specific to this historical period (Moore, Pritchard, A. Ayer, C. Stevenson, B. Russell, M. Schlick, R. Carnap, etc.) did not take root. Later, Sartre, Merleau-Pontita, and their followers, refuting such models, proposed their own, existentialist-Marxist model of morality. Accepting the revolutionary meaning of Marxism,

In Soviet times, morality appears in the form of a series of requirements for a person, which are devoid of persistence and which rather resemble situational prescriptions for a particular group of people or for society as a whole. We can say that this period is characterized by a general idea of morality, where it is accepted as defining and exhaustive for the person. At the same time, the heterogeneity of morality is lost. The nature of morality in Soviet times was the judgments of the commune, the precepts that came from under the ruling elite and which gave the right to appeal its provisions or to sharp criticism from society, which became a great misfortune. Thus, one «hand» of the Soviet government constantly issued slogans about goodness, conscience, honor and other virtues, and the other suppressed, punished severely for any manifestations of humanity that did not fit into the framework of its ideology. All the slogans were thus picked up by Soviet scientists, deployed within the permitted canons of «non-contradiction and coherence», but they all remained in the air because they no longer had a foundation on which to build morality for centuries. According to A. McIntyre, the ideology of Marxism itself thus suffered from «deadly moral impoverishment» [15, p. 4].

The materialist morality of Marxism seduced the worker with good due to the idea of the strength of ties between things. Communicating with nature, he moves away from the world of bourgeois courtesy and begins to realize the urgent need for things. This real determinism – recognizable to workers in labor – met the needs of revolutionary doctrine, allowed to determine the consequences of certain actions and seemed to give a person the opportunity to transform reality globally, and allegedly helped to help people find the law of their own activities and conditions of its effectiveness. change the existing order of things. In short, several existentialist ideas have been proposed as a philosophical justification for Marxist morality: the recognition of the reflexive climate of subjectivity; acceptance of the fact that the human consciousness always feels dissatisfied and with the same movement reveals the reality and seeks to surpass it; the human mind is within the situation; man as something accidental has no basis for being, but he «exists»; moral values - something historical; man is free, although he is recognized to serve the revolutionary will, because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. the human mind is within the situation; man as something accidental has no basis for being, but he «exists»; moral values – something historical; man is free, although he is recognized to serve the revolutionary will, because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving it of the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515]. because it presupposes freedom as a metaphysical fact, without depriving it of the significance of the desire for liberation. Freedom as such can never be eliminated, but it is always in danger of being subjected to violence or coercion [16, p. 76, 81]. Here it is appropriate to note AF Kony, who in the 19th century claimed that «punish the subject when he breaks the law, but do not kill the sense of self-worth in man» [17, p. 515].

Thus, it was from Soviet times that the decline of morality began, which began with an attempt to combine moral theory and practice into a common universal standard as a rational justification for politics: «The party does

not approve of this, so do not approve». This led, in fact, to the fact that manifestations of immorality (cruelty, injustice, etc.) were approved and supported if they were justified by party policy. Not surprisingly, it was after the Soviet era of «dictatorial morality» that many philosophical treatises with different views on morality emerged. Scholars raise a dispute about the origins of morality, and the debate unfolds over whether morality is a product of reason (common sense) or its origin from human feelings (R.G. Apresyan, A.A. Huseynova, V.V. Vasilyev, O.F. Gryaznov, etc.) [18, p. 623–625; 19, p. 145; 20, p. 38]. But if this question remains debatable, then a new one arises: does humanity use its own ideas of reason or cognition of the senses to find the difference between virtue and vice? [21, p. 498]. It should be noted that the question of morality, in any case, implies only its active nature, while according to D. Hume, the mind – is a cognitive ability, which is aimed at bringing ideas (judgments based on the demonstration of evidence) and / or the relationship between objects that we know from our own experience (judgments based on probabilities). And only in the second case, in his opinion, the mind participates in the act, however, its role is seen as secondary. Revealing the relationship between cause and effect, the mind is able to direct, adjust the impulses that motivate action, but does not generate them [21, p. 499]. So we can say.

The most striking thing is that in modern society there are no guarantees or rational ways to the moral consent of society. There can be no such ways also because in modern society there are no possibilities and ways to establish a clear hierarchy of preferences among moral requirements. Modern morality is a philosophical and legal chimera, because it begins with the level of personal choice of behavior in free space, the boundaries of which are determined only by legal norms. Recently, the individual choice of a person of «moral foundations» prevails agreed in certain social groups «moral attributes». For example, a survey of law students (48 people) showed that 68% of students believe that «only their personal definition of bad and good matters to them», 30% agree to obey the social requirements of morality, but with a certain purpose of achieving something «, the rest of the students recognize that» moral precepts must be rooted in a person from childhood, and must be unique for the whole society. «Thus, the majority today recognizes itself as an independent person in the moral field and even the author of the moral law, without thinking at all about the value of moral postulates on which it is based».

The current state of morality in Western countries is defined as abandoned, and the remnants of moral values are reminiscent of a once-existing culture in which no one wants to believe and accept. By changing the inner world of man through distorted notions of good and evil, people build new conditions for their existence. Yes, those manifestations of the human psyche that were once considered immoral are now protected by law. We can say that the era of cognitive distortion of morality has come - that is, a gradual and constant deviation from moral principles, which is manifested in the behavior and thinking of individuals. These failures are due to a number of reasons: prejudices, stereotypes, inability to analyze information, indifference.

Today, each person asks himself the question «why should I do just that and what will happen to me if I do things my own way»? And really, is it possible to make a person love to self-sacrifice, to bear his professional burden not only within the law but also morally? If the ancient man knew that for evil, immoral actions, the Lord's punishment awaits him, then the need to obey the earthly law, which does not contradict the divine law, there is no doubt. What is it like today, when man is detached from the law of God, actually deprived of memory and open to committing all kinds of lawlessness? We completely agree with the opinion of scientists on this issue, because neither analytical philosophy nor phenomenological tradition can help to establish order in the world of morality and science [15, p.7], especially when morality is «fictional».

Morality today is on a slippery slope of perfectionist self-presentation, characterized by a demonstration of one's own perfection. The world, detached from the virtues and precepts by which the ancestors lived, becomes a fiction of each of its pseudo-scientific dimensions. The word morality is thus in chaos, just as much as the word law (which we see in the example of the changing rule of law). The conceptual foundations of moral laws, today, are increasingly prone to the emergence of «morality somewhere in the middle», «morality of coherence» or «neutral morality». This phenomenon was born in the field of «legal loyalty» and tolerance, which was the result of the final erosion of the integrity of moral postulates that have been formed over the centuries.

Conclusions

Thus, we can conclude that the phenomenon of the category of «morality» opens on the following provisions:

1) morality has always been interpreted as a good that is in harmony with the soul (feelings) and affects behavior;

2) modern rethinking of morality necessarily adds to the past its own meaning, that is, modernizes it. A completely different approach will be the analysis of moral phenomena in terms of their role in the life of the past, ie the actual historical research using methods that characterize the ideas and values of the past in relation to the

circumstances that gave rise to them, and in the future – to understand specific actions motivated by these moral (cultural) guidelines. Such priorities are characteristic of the modern paradigm of moral and intellectual history.

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